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Abstract
A fundamental question in memory research is how different forms of memory interact. Previous research has shown that people
rely on working memory (WM) in short-term recognition tasks; a common view is that episodic memory (EM) only influences
performance on these tasks when WM maintenance is disrupted. However, retrieval of memories from EM has been widely
observed during brief periods of quiescence, raising the possibility that EM retrievals during maintenance—critically, before a
response can be prepared—might affect short-term recognition memory performance even in the absence of distraction. We
hypothesized that this influence would be mediated by the lingering presence of reactivated EM content in WM. We obtained
support for this hypothesis in three experiments, showing that delay-period EM reactivation introduces incidentally associated
information (context) into WM, and that these retrieved associations negatively impact subsequent recognition, leading to
substitution errors (Experiment 1) and slowing of accurate responses (Experiment 2). FMRI pattern analysis showed that slowing
is mediated by the content of EM reinstatement (Experiment 3). These results expose a previously hidden influence of EM on
WM, raising new questions about the adaptive nature of their interaction.
Keywords Episodicmemory .Workingmemory . Short-termmemory . Recollection . Hippocampus
Our memories do not exist in isolation, and neither do the
neural circuits that represent them. Experiences may produce
transient records in working memory—a temporary store for
information to be maintained and manipulated over delays of
seconds (Baddeley, 1992; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Repov &
Baddeley, 2006). Experiences can also simultaneously lay
down more lasting traces as episodic memories, available to
be recalled at a later time (beyond minutes), allowing us to
relive specific, previously experienced events tied to the time
and place of their occurrence (Tulving, 1983).
Early models proposed that working memory and long-
term memory operated wholly in parallel (Shallice &
Warrington, 1970). Evidence for the dissociation between
working memory and episodic memory largely came from
lesion studies, which found that damage to the medial tempo-
ral lobe (MTL) caused severe episodic memory deficits (Cave
& Squire, 1992; Squire, 1992), while working memory, asso-
ciated with the prefrontal cortex (Cohen et al., 1994),
remained intact (Drachman & Arbit, 1966). More recent
models propose that they support each other (Baddeley &
Hitch, 2000; Cohen & O’Reilly, 1996). There is accumulating
evidence that episodic memory, and its neural substrates in the
MTL, are engaged during short-term memory tasks that also
engage working memory (Axmacher et al., 2007; Lewis-
Peacock, Cohen, & Norman, 2016; Ranganath, 2005;
Ranganath & Blumenfeld 2005; Ranganath, Cohen, Dam, &
D’Esposito, 2004; Ranganath, D’Esposito, Friederici, &
Ungerleider, 2005), suggesting these memory systems do
not operate entirely independently of one another.
Experiments testing for an interaction between episodic
memory (EM) and working memory (WM) have historically
focused on the hypothesis that EM is used to support WM
when maintenance is disrupted, leading to errors that reflect
features of EM. For instance, participants show proactive in-
terference from recently studied stimuli when WM is
disrupted for 18 seconds (Wickens, Dalezman, &
Eggemeier, 1976). However, subsequent research suggests
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that EMmay contribute toWMmore ubiquitously, even when
WM is not disrupted during 4-second delays (Atkins &
Reuter-Lorenz, 2008, 2011). Here, we investigate the nature
of these interactions to ask how EM contributes to undisrupted
WM.
Do ongoing reinstatements from episodic
memory influence working memory, even
in the absence of distraction?
A growing number of studies indicate that during periods of
rest, the neural structures that support EM are active (Buckner,
2010) and appear to be reinstating recent experiences
(Tambini, Ketz, & Davachi, 2010) or activating potential fu-
ture scenarios constructed on the basis of past experiences
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007). These reinstatements trigger coor-
dinated activity patterns across a broad swath of cortical re-
gions, including those presumably involved in WM mainte-
nance, such as the prefrontal cortex (Miller & Cohen, 2001).
This widespread activation is reliably present even during
brief lapses in external stimulation (Logothetis et al., 2012),
such as those typically used as maintenance periods in WM
experiments.
These observations lead us to ask the question: How do
ongoing reinstatements from EM affect the content of WM,
even when the latter is not being disrupted? We hypothesized
that an influence of EM on WM search might be observable
by more sensitive measures than substitution errors during
recall: through examination of reaction times (Atkins &
Reuter-Lorenz, 2008, 2011) and the use of content-specific
pattern analysis in neuroimaging.
Using context as a signature of episodic
memory
To test our hypothesis, we leverage the fact that retrievals from
EM carry with them temporal and associative context
(Howard & Kahana, 2002), such that triggering the recall of
one memory from a given context can cause the subsequent,
involuntary recall of other memories sharing that context
(Bornstein & Norman, 2017; Hupbach, Gomez, & Nadel,
2009). This can occur even at the short delays typically asso-
ciated with WM (Hannula, Tranel, & Cohen, 2006).
Therefore, we reasoned that if reinstatements from EM oc-
curred during WM maintenance, then these reinstatements
would likely be of memories that shared an encoding context
with the target stimuli. Even if these reinstated memories do
not lead to overt errors, they may intrude on or degrade other,
task-relevant representations being maintained in WM, and
thereby affect search and response times on subsequent
decisions—even several seconds later, and even in the
absence of further EM reinstatement (Atkins & Reuter-
Lorenz, 2008). They may also express themselves in patterns
of neural activity reflective of the reinstated memories.
It is also possible that episodic memories are reinstat-
ed at the moment of retrieval instead of or in addition
to during WM maintenance. Research on prospective
memory, a memory task in which an individual must
remember to perform an action at a target event in the
future (e.g., remembering to stop at the supermarket on
the way home; see Brandimonte, Einstein, & McDaniel,
1996), point to a reason why EM reinstatements only at
probe could be strategic. Constantly monitoring the en-
vironment for the target event is cognitively costly; re-
lying on environmental context clues to reinstate the
intended action at the relevant decision point (e.g., get-
ting into the car after work) could free cognitive re-
sources for other tasks during the delay (McDaniel &
Einstein, 2000). Measuring the timing of memory rein-
statements using neuroimaging over the course of a task
can help address whether EM context reinstatements are
ongoing or locked to retrieval.
Present study: Three experiments measuring
how episodic memory reinstatements can
inject contextual associates into working
memory, even in the absence of distraction
We present three experiments testing the hypothesis that
context reinstated from EM intrudes on WM mainte-
nance. In Experiment 1, we show that participants sub-
stitute same-context items in response to interference in
a classic short-term delayed-recall task with distraction
during the maintenance period. These intrusions are dis-
tinct from the recency effect traditionally used to iden-
tify episodic influence in this task. In Experiment 2, we
show that the influence of reinstated context is evident
in response times, even when accuracy is at ceiling. In
Experiment 3, we repeat the task from Experiment 2
with fMRI, and use multivariate pattern analysis
(MVPA) to generate a trial-by-trial neural measure of
how likely it was that participants were recalling a spe-
cific past context. We use this neural index of reinstate-
ment to predict the degree of response-time bias on a
given trial. Finally, we show that EM reinstatement af-
fects responses via a specific effect on the contents of
WM during the maintenance period.
Together, the results of these experiments reveal a nov-
el aspect of the interaction between EM and WM: When
target items are stored in WM, ongoing reinstatements
from EM can inject contextual associates of these targets
into WM, leading to confusion about whether these asso-
ciates were part of the target set.
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci
Experiment 1
Previous studies using short-term recall tests have found
that distraction during delay periods causes participants to
rely on EM rather than WM, as evidenced by the fact that
errors are primarily words substituted from recent trials
(Brown, 1958; Lewis-Peacock et al., 2016; Peterson &
Peterson, 1959; Rose, Buchsbaum, & Craik, 2014;
Zanto, Clapp, Rubens, Karlsson, & Gazzaley, 2016).
Here, we tested whether these substitutions can be biased
by the encoding context of the target words. Specifically,
if the four target words are sampled from one of the 12-
word encoding contexts established at the outset of the
experiment, does this lead to substitution of other
(nontarget) words from the same context? The logic of
the study is shown in Fig. 1, and examples of the initial
context learning and delayed recall trials are shown in
Fig. 2a–b.
Methods and materials
Participants
Fifteen Princeton psychology students (nine females; ages 18–
22 years) completed the study for course credit. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and provided
informed consent. The study protocol was approved by the
Princeton University Institutional Review Board.
Stimuli
The experiment used six scene pictures, each of which
served as a Bcontext^ that uniquely linked one of six
sets of 12 words. The words and context pictures were
not organized by semantic category; instead, the words
used in each set and the image associated with each set
were randomized across participants. The pictures were
color photographs of famous outdoor landmarks. The
words were concrete nouns drawn from the Medical
Research Council Psycholinguistic Database (Wilson,
1988). All words had a maximum of two syllables,
Kucera–Francis written frequency of at least 2, a famil-
iarity rating of at least 200, a concreteness rating of at
least 500, and an imageability rating of at least 500.
Procedure
Word-context learning trials The goal of the initial context
learning phase was to associate words with distinct
encoding contexts. On each of 48 learning trials, partic-
ipants were shown four words drawn from the same
set alongside the photograph associated with that set
(see Fig. 2a). The picture served as an encoding context.
To help participants encode the 12 words associated with
the same picture as all belonging to the same context,
each word was presented three times along with three
other words randomly sampled from the same set and
Fig. 1 Episodic memory can inject incidental information into working
memory. a Episodic memory encodes items along with the context in
which they were learned. b When presented with target items to
maintain over a delay period, working memory maintenance may be
periodically influenced by reinstatements from episodic memory. c
These reinstatements may contain other items sharing the encoding
context of the target items. d These items might affect subsequent
behavior, by impeding decision-making when these items support the
incorrect decision, e and/or by facilitating decision-making when they
support the correct decision
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always displayed in the same context (i.e., with the pic-
ture associated with that list). On each trial, the four
words and the picture associated with those words were
presented for 2 seconds before the words disappeared
and the picture remained on-screen. Four seconds later,
the context picture was replaced by a prompt asking
participants to vocally repeat back the four words just
shown, and to then briefly describe the picture they had
just seen. Participants were given 6 seconds to respond.
Trials were of fixed length, regardless of participant’s
responses.
Free-recall phase After the learning block was completed,
participants performed 54 trials of a short-term retention task.
On each trial, participants were shown four target words. The
four target words were all drawn from the same context. No
picture was presented alongside the words. Words remained
on the screen for 2 seconds and were followed by an 18-
second delay.
There were three types of delay (see Fig. 2b). Delay trial
types were randomly intermixed, with 18 trials of each type.
In the no-distraction condition, participants were shown a fix-
ation cross, in the center of the screen, for the entirety of the
18-second delay. In the break-distraction condition, partici-
pants were shown a fixation cross in the center of the screen
for 6 seconds. After 6 seconds, participants were shown a
randomly generated three-digit number in the center of the
screen. The number served as a prompt to count down out
loud by sevens, starting at that number. After 6 seconds of
counting, participants were again shown a centered fixation
cross for 6 more seconds. In the full-distraction condition,
participants were shown a three-digit number at the start of
the delay period, and instructed to count backwards out loud
by sevens, starting from the prompted number, for the entire
delay period.
In all conditions, participants were given 8 seconds
after the delay period to vocally recall the words shown
at the beginning of the trial. These responses were re-
corded and scored for the number of words correctly
recalled (zero through four). Mistakes were categorized
as one of three types: (1) words from the same
encoding context as the targets, (2) words from the pre-
vious free recall trial, or (3) other words learned during
the experiment but not in Categories 1 or 2. (No sub-
stitutions were made using words that were not learned
during the experiment.)
Experiment 1 results
We expected to see increasing numbers of substitution errors
as the demands on working memory increased; therefore, we
predicted participants would make the fewest substitutions
following delays with no distraction, and the most substitu-
tions following full distraction.
Consistent with our predictions, participants made more
errors in the full-distraction condition than in the break-
distraction condition, t(14) = 3.2756, p < .01, paired, two-
sided t test, and the no-distraction condition, t(14) = 6.4526,
p < .001, and more errors in the break-distraction condition
than in the no-distraction condition, t(14) = 4.4852, p < .001
(see Fig. 2c).
We also predicted that distraction would increase re-
liance on episodic memory and, accordingly, that sub-
stitution errors would reflect information retrieved from
episodic memory. To test this hypothesis, we marked
errors as belonging to one of three categories—two that
specifically reflected intrusions from episodic memory:
previous-target substitutions and same-context substitu-
tions, as well as other errors, which reflected intrusions
or failures of other kinds. These categories were moti-
vated by the following considerations. First we expected
recently experienced words—in particular, the four
words from the trial immediately previous—to be most
accessible in episodic memory and therefore likely to be
recalled, brought into working memory, and mistakenly
invoke a target response. We refer to these as previous-
target substitutions. Second, we expected that maintain-
ing target words in working memory would trigger ep-
isodic memory reinstatement of the context in which
these words were studied (Gershman, Schapiro, &
Hupbach, 2013; Howard & Kahana, 2002). If this oc-
curs, we should see an elevated substitution rate for the
eight words that were studied in the same context as the
target words, but that were not part of the current trial’s
target set. We refer to these as same-context substitu-
tions. The context from which the target words were
drawn changed with each trial, ensuring that previous-
target and same-context substitutions were mutually ex-
clusive possibilities. Finally, we refer to substitutions
from one of the 56 remaining words learned in the
experiment, that were neither targets, previous-target or
same-context errors, as other errors.
By categorizing errors in this way, we could compare the
number of each kind of error to the number that would be
expected if the errors were drawn at random from the 68
possible nontarget words. While all three kinds of words
should be present in episodic memory, we predicted that pre-
vious-target errors, reflecting recency, and same-context er-
rors, reflecting the bias toward clustered recall of items shar-
ing encoding context, should be overrepresented relative to
other errors.
If substitution errors were uniformly distributed
among the 68 possible words, only 4/68 of the errors
made in each interference condition should be previous-
target substitutions. Participants substituted words from
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the previous trial at a higher rate than would be expect-
ed if they were randomly substituting words previously
learned in the experiment (see Fig. 2d). As computed
by bootstrap analysis, the amount of previous trial sub-
stitutions made was greater than chance on full interfer-
ence (subject mean = 5.20, SD = 4.95; bootstrapped
mean = .64, SD = .10; p < .001), break interference
(subject mean = 2.67, SD = 3.04; bootstrapped mean
= .34, SD = .08; p < .001), and no interference trials
(subject mean = .47, SD = 1.55; bootstrapped mean =
.07, SD = .04; p < .001). This suggests that information
from previous trials from episodic memory entered
working memory, even when working memory was not
overloaded.
Similarly, if substitution errors were uniformly distrib-
uted among the 68 possible words, only 8/68 of the errors
made in each interference condition should be same-
context substitutions. Instead, on full interference trials,
the proportion of same-context substitutions was greater
than what would be expected by chance (subject mean =
Fig. 2 Experiment 1: Free-recall task with added context. a Participants
(n = 15) studied lists of words in contexts distinguished by different
pictures. b We probed how these contexts affect performance on a
short-term recall task under three conditions: (1) when working
memory was not disrupted, (2) briefly disrupted (break distraction), or
(3) completely disrupted (full distraction). c Participants made more
errors in the distraction conditions compared to the no distraction
condition (p < .01 for all comparisons, paired, two-sided t tests). *p <
.05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Black horizontal lines within boxes indicate
median substitutions. Bottom and top edges of the box indicate the 25th
and 75th percentiles. Whiskers extend to the most extreme data points not
considered outliers. Black points outside boxes indicate outliers. dWithin
each interference condition, left bars reflect subject data and right bars
reflect simulated data based on randomized substitutions from the
experiment’s word set. In all three conditions, participants made errors
that reflected the influence of reinstated context. Specifically, participants
substituted words from the previous trial at a higher rate than would be
expected if they were randomly substituting words previously learned in
the experiment. As computed by bootstrap analysis, the number of
previous trial substitutions was greater than chance on full-interference
(p < .001), break-interference (p < .001), and no-interference trials (p <
.001). e Participants also made substitution errors during recall that
reflected the encoding context of the target set, or same-context errors,
at a higher rate than would be expected if they were randomly substituting
words previously learned in the experiment. As computed by bootstrap
analysis, the amount of same-context errors made was greater than chance
on full-interference (p = .001), break-interference (p = .001), and no-
interference trials (p = .025). Box plots follow the same conventions as
in d
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3.40, SD = 2.77; bootstrapped mean 1.29, SD = .21; p =
.001). This suggests that context information was indeed
affecting decision-making when working memory was
overloaded (see Fig. 2e). Same-context substitutions were
also greater than what would be expected by chance in the
break condition (subject mean = 1.33, SD = 1.59;
bootstrapped mean = .86, SD = .19; p = .001).
Critically, although the frequency of substitutions on the
no-interference trials was low (mean = 1.13, SD = 2.67;
see Fig. 2c), when they did occur, they were biased to-
ward coming from the same context as the target words
(subject mean = .40, SD = .91; bootstrapped mean = .13,
SD = .08; p = .025).
Experiment 1 discussion
Participants completed a short-term retention task with
three distraction conditions. When there was no distrac-
tion during the retention delay, participants made almost
no errors, consistent with the idea that they were able to
easily use working memory to complete this task. Errors
increased when participants were made to perform a
distractor task midway through the delay, and were fur-
ther increased when the distractor task spanned the entire
retention interval. These errors took the form of
substituting other words from the experiment in place
of the current trial’s target words.
A disproportionate number of substitutions were made
using words from the same encoding context as the target
words, despite the fact that these kinds of words repre-
sented only a small fraction of the words used on the
task. This distribution of substitutions is consistent with
previous observations that, when working memory main-
tenance is interrupted, participants rely on recency-biased
retrievals from episodic memory (Lewis-Peacock et al.,
2016; Rose et al., 2014; Zanto et al., 2016). Critically,
our results also establish that the context-based nature of
errors can serve as an additional signature of episodic
memory recruitment in these tasks, augmenting the suite
of tools available to identify EM recruitment. As would
normally be predicted, both kinds of errors were most
evident when retention in working memory was subject
to interference. Notably, however, the pattern of errors
indicated the engagement of episodic memory even when
distraction was momentary, hinting that it might be pres-
ent even in the absence of distraction—that is, under
conditions ordinarily assumed to rely exclusively on
working memory.
Our findings raise two questions: First, does episodic
memory affect working memory in the absence of ex-
ternal distraction? While substitutions in the no-
distraction condition were significantly biased toward
being from the same encoding context as the target
words, there were very few errors (of any kind) in this
condition, making us wary of drawing strong conclu-
sions from this result on its own. Second, when during
the task does episodic-memory retrieval occur, and how
does it influence performance? Are episodic memories
retrieved during the delay, either incidentally and/or to
support maintenance, or strictly at the time of response?
We use the signature of context effects established in
Expe r imen t 1 t o add r e s s t h e s e que s t i on s i n
Experiments 2 and 3.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we used a more sensitive measure,
reaction time (RT), to investigate the effect of context
on behavior. Participants performed the same context
training exercise from Experiment 1 (see Fig. 3a), this
time followed by a delayed-nonmatch-to-sample task
(DNMS; Fig. 3b), with no distractions during the delay
periods.
Methods and materials
Participants
Eighty-eight Princeton students (55 females; ages 18–21
years; native English speakers) completed the study for
course credit. All participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and provided informed consent. The
Princeton University Institutional Review Board ap-
proved the study protocol. Eight participants were ex-
cluded from RT analyses on the basis of their accuracy
scores being less than chance performance, leaving the
participants reported here.
Procedure
In the learning phase, participants studied four different
sets of words, each containing 12 words drawn from the
same set of words used in Experiment 1. Each word set
was paired with a unique context picture. The paired
words and orientation of each context picture were ran-
domly assigned anew for each participant. Learning-
phase trials followed the same procedure as in
Experiment 1 (see Figs. 2a and 3a), now over four
contexts of 12 words each.
In the testing phase, participants performed 60 trials
of a DNMS task, in which targets were selected from
the words learned in the learning phase (see Fig. 3b).
On each trial, one context was selected at random, and
then four target words were selected from within that
context. These words were shown on the screen together
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for 2 seconds—critically, without the associated context
image. When the words disappeared, they were replaced
by a centered fixation cross, displayed for 18 seconds.
Participants were instructed to use this delay to remem-
ber the four words they had just seen. There was no
distraction during the delay period.
After the delay period, participants were shown a
probe word and asked to respond Bmismatch^ if the
given word was not one of the four they had just seen
on this trial, or Bmatch^ if it was one of the four target
words. The keys used to signify mismatch and match—
the left and right arrows—were counterbalanced across
Fig. 3 Experiment 2: DNMS task with added context. a In the context-
learning phase, participants studied four sets of words, each set paired
with a unique context picture.b In the testing phase, participants
performed a delayed-nonmatch-to-sample (DNMS) task, in which they
remembered four target words across an 18-s delay. After the delay, they
were shown a single probe word and askedwhether that word was not one
of the four they had just seen. Response timeswere recorded and used as a
measure of whether the participants’ performance had been affected by
context information reinstated from episodic memory. c Subsets of two
example contexts are presented for illustrative purposes. d We
hypothesized that the contents of working memory are influenced by
reinstatements from episodic memory. These reinstatements activate
working-memory representations of trial-irrelevant words that were
linked to the target words during the context-learning phase. We
predicted that, when the probe word was one of the targets, participants
would be fastest to respond because the target probe should clearly match
the content of working memory, allowing the search process to terminate
quickly. For nontarget probe trials, we predicted participants would
respond more slowly because they needed to exhaustively search
through the contents of working memory to decide to reject the probe.
Within nontarget probe trials, we predicted participants would be slowest
to respond to lure probes, because these probes would match the context
information in working memory elicited by the target words but
mismatch the actual target words. Because this conflicting evidence was
not present in other-context probe trials—the probe word did not match
the context information or target words in working memory—we
predicted participants would be less impaired on other-context probe
trials
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participants. A successful response was indicated by a
green fixation cross, while an unsuccessful response (in-
correct response or time-out after 4 seconds) was indi-
cated with a red fixation cross.
Probe words could be one of three types: (1) target
probes were drawn from the four-word target set pre-
sented on the current trial; (2) lure probes were drawn
from the same context list as the target words, but,
critically, these probes were not one of the target words;
(3) other-context words were drawn from one of the
three contexts other than the one from which the target
words were drawn. Target probes were drawn from the
target words, so the correct response to target probes
was that they were a Bmatch^ to the targets; lure and
other-context probe words did not contain one of the
target words, so the correct response on lure and
other-context probe trials was Bmismatch.^ Participants
were not signaled as to which kind of probe was being
used on each trial.
There were equal numbers of target, lure, and other-context
probe trials, so a participant who responded Bmismatch^ on
every trial would be correct on 66% of trials. Eight partici-
pants fell below this accuracy threshold, whom we excluded
from further analysis.
Experiment 2 results
Accuracy
Given the absence of distraction, accuracy was high across
all three conditions (mean = 94.84%, SEM = .78%) with no
significant differences in accuracy between target (mean =
95.01%, SEM = .82%, other-context (mean = 95.10%,
SEM = .74%), or lure trials (mean = 94.31%, SEM =
.78%, p > .2 by paired, two-sided t tests for all pairwise
comparisons; see Fig. 4a). Because these inaccurate trials
were rare and did not vary in proportion between catego-
ries, we excluded inaccurate trials from the RT analyses.
Reaction times
We predicted that participants would on average respond
fastest to target probes, as the probe word would most reliably
match the contents of working memory (see Fig. 3d). In con-
trast, nontarget probe trials, in which the probe word did not
match any of the targets, would be slower because they re-
quired an exhaustive search of the contents of working mem-
ory to decide on rejection (a prediction that follows from both
Fig. 4 Study 2 results: Response times reflect influence of study context.
a For participants with above-chance performance (n = 80), accuracy was
high across all three conditions (mean = 94.84%, SEM = .78%) with no
difference in accuracy between target (mean = 95.01%, SD = 7.37%),
other-context (mean = 95.10%, SD = 6.59%), or lure trials (mean =
94.31%, SD = 6.94%, p > .2 by paired, two-sided t tests for all pairwise
comparisons). Solid lines reflect mean accuracy. Dashed lines reflect
median accuracy. b RTs were log-transformed and z-scored within
subject to control for individual differences in mean RTs and nonnormal
RT distributions. Task-irrelevant context information slowed RTs; using
paired, two-sided t tests, we found that participants responded slower to
lure probes (mean zRT= .14, SD= .16) than to target probes (mean zRT =
−0.11, SD = .20), t(79) = −6.7603, p < .001, or other-context probes
(mean zRT = −0.03, SD = .14), t(79) = −6.8583, p < .001. *p < .05,
***p < .001
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serial and parallel models of working memory search;
Sternberg, 1969; Ratcliff, 1978).
On nontarget probe trials, which included lure and other-
context probes, participants had to make the same response: to
reject the probe word as one of the targets. Thus, any differ-
ence in RT between these two trial types could not be attrib-
uted to differences in the required response.
Within nontarget probe trials, we predicted that participants
would be slower to respond to lure than to other-context
probes: If context reinstatement from episodic memory acti-
vates trial-irrelevant words from the same context as the target
words, then lure words can become activated in working
memory. If this occurs, activated lure information will match
lure probes, increasing uncertainty and slowing Bmismatch^
responses to these probes. Other-context probes would not
induce such uncertainty, since they would neither match the
targets nor would they match reinstated lure information.
Response times were log-transformed and z-scored within
subject to control for individual differences in mean RTs or
nonnormal RT distributions; however, the results reported below
are also present in the raw RTs (see Supplemental Fig. S1).
Using paired, two-sided t tests, we found that participants
responded fastest to target probes (mean zRT = −0.11, SEM =
.02) compared with lure probes (mean zRT = .14, SEM = .02),
t(79) = −6.7603, p < .0019 (see Fig. 4b), or other-context
probes (mean zRT = −0.03, SEM = .02), t(79) = −2.4133, p
= .018. Critically, we found participants responded slower to
lure probes than to other-context probes, t(79) = −6.8583, p <
.001 (see Fig. 4b). The latter is noteworthy as the only differ-
ence between lure and other-context probes is whether the
probe word was learned in the same context as the target
during the task-irrelevant part of the experiment.
Experiment 2 discussion
In Experiment 2, participants performed a DNMS task using
study words that had previously been associated with one of
four separate contexts. The lack of distraction and the relative-
ly short (18 second) delay period were chosen to make it easy
for participants to rely solely on working memory to perform
the task. Indeed, as has been repeatedly observed in tasks with
this kind of structure, accuracy was near ceiling and did not
differ across trial types. However, we observed an effect of
encoding context on response times. Specifically, while re-
sponses to target probes were faster than responses to both
kinds of nontarget probes, responses to lure probes—those
sharing an encoding context with the target—were slower
than responses to probes from any of the other three contexts.
This result is particularly striking because it is in the oppo-
site direction of what would be expected if responses were
simply biased toward the more prevalent response type (mis-
match). If this were the case, then participants should be faster
to respond to lure or other-context probes (two thirds of trials),
rather than target probes (one third of trials). Instead, the re-
sults support the idea that responses may reflect deliberative
accumulation of information from working memory, and that
this process can be slowed by the intrusion of countervailing
information: the context-driven reinstatement of lure words
from episodic memory. These reinstatements need not cata-
strophically interfere with maintenance—rather than occupy-
ing discrete Bslots^ in working memory, they may simply
reduce the fidelity of the representation of the target set (e.g.,
Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014), slowing the integration process
without producing an incorrect response.
Note that the same logic should apply irrespective of whether
the probe is a lure or an other-context probe—if the correct
response is Bmismatch,^ but (during the delay) participants men-
tally reinstate the context matching the probe, then this should
lead to slower RTs to that probe. However, reinstatements of the
target-word context should bemuchmore frequent than reinstate-
ments of other contexts, which would explain why responses to
lure probes (from the target context) are slower, on average, than
are responses to other-context probes.
Experiment 3
Experiment 2 demonstrated that encoding context has an ef-
fect on responses following a delay, even in the absence of
distraction. We interpret this result as following from putative
episodic memory reinstatements during the delay period. We
reasoned that this effect, observed in Experiment 2 as an av-
erage across trials, should be determined on a trial-by-trial
basis by whether episodic memory reinstatement of the probe
context occurred on that trial, as well as which memories were
reinstated. To directly test this, in Experiment 3, we had par-
ticipants perform the same distraction-free DNMS task from
Experiment 2 while being scanned using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), which allowed us to use multivar-
iate pattern analysis (MVPA) to measure the content of mem-
ory reinstatement on each trial.
Methods and materials
Participants
Forty healthy participants (26 females; ages 18–30 years)
were recruited. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and provided informed consent. The Princeton
University Institutional Review Board approved the study
protocol. Exclusion criteria for recruitment included the pres-
ence of metal in the body, claustrophobia, neurological dis-
eases or disorders, tattoos above the waist, pregnancy, not
speaking English as a native language, and left-handedness.
Four participants were excluded from the final analyses for the
following reasons: excessive movement in the scanner—
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defined as maximal instantaneous displacement larger than
3 mm across any individual scanner run (two participants),
or numerically below-chance accuracy on the DNMS task
(two participants). Data are reported for the remaining 36
participants.
Stimuli
The fixation training phase used scene and scrambled scene pic-
tures that were not used in any other phase of the experiment. In
the context learning phase, participants learned four word sets
each with its own context picture. The pictures were either faces
or scenes. The face pictures were emotionally neutral and of
nonfamous individuals, taken from the Psychological Image
Collection at Stirling University (PICS; http://pics.stir.ac.uk).
The scene pictures depicted two natural, nonfamous places.
One of the faces and one of the scenes were always displayed
on the left side of the screen; the other face and other scene were
always displayed on the right side of the screen. Thus, each set
was associated with one of the following context stimuli: a face
on the left, a face on the right, a scene on the left, or a scene on the
right. The test phase followed the sameDNMSprocedure used in
Experiment 2. The localizer phase used a different set of scene
pictures, along with scrambled scene pictures, neutral faces, and
object pictures. All picture stimuli across all tasks were color
photos scaled to the same size (500 × 500 pixels), equalized for
overall brightness, andwere displayed 7 degrees from the right or
7 degrees from the left of fixation.
Procedure
Prior to the fMRI session, participants practiced the tasks out-
side of the MRI scanner. Practice consisted of self-paced read-
ing of written explanations of the fixation, context learning,
DNMS, and localizer tasks in addition to a fixed number of
practice trials of each task. Participants were encouraged to
ask questions in case they needed any instruction clarification.
After participants reported that they understood the instruc-
tions, they completed another practice trial of the context-
learning task and DNMS task in the scanner.
After practice in the scanner, participants were given 5
minutes of fixation training, during which pictures appeared
7 degrees from the right or left of fixation. The goal of this
training was to ensure participants perceived the context pic-
tures as lateralized, rather than turning their gaze directly to
the picture. We used an EyeLink 1000 eye tracker (SR
Research, Ontario, Canada) to give participants real-time
feedback; if participants looked away from fixation, then the
images would disappear and an BX^ would appear in the cen-
ter of the screen until fixation was reestablished.
After fixation training, participants completed the context-
list-learning and DNMS tasks described in Experiment 2.
Trials in which participants did not respond before the 4-
second deadline were excluded from analyses, since there
was no response time for these trials.
In the final localizer phase, participants performed a localizer
task that was used to discriminate regions of the cortex that
preferentially process left and right lateralized face and scene
pictures. In this task, pictures were presented one at a time, and
participants were asked to press a key indicating whether the
currently presented picture was the same as the one immediately
preceding. Pictures were presented in miniblocks of 10 presen-
tations each. Eight of the images in each block were trial unique,
and two were repeats. Stimuli in each miniblock were chosen
from a large stimulus set of pictures not used in the main exper-
iment, and each belonged to one of four categories—faces, ob-
jects, scenes, or phase-scrambled scenes—andwere presented on
either the left or right side of the screen. Thus, there were eight
different kinds of miniblock: left face, right face, left object, right
object, left scene, right scene, left scrambled scene, and right
scrambled scene. Pictures were each presented for 500 ms, and
followed by a 1.5-second intertrial interval. Participants complet-
ed a total of 24 miniblocks (three blocks per four picture catego-
ries presented on either side of the screen), with each miniblock
separated by a 12-second interblock interval.
Finally, after the scanned portions of the experiment had com-
pleted, participants remained in the scanner to complete a mem-
ory task. Participants were shown each of the 48 words from
context learning, one at a time, above all four context pictures,
and asked to report both which context was correct and their
confidence about that judgement, between one (low confidence)
and four (high confidence). A complete timeline of the experi-
ment can be seen in Fig. 5.
Imaging methods
Data acquisition Functional magnetic resonance images
(fMRI) were acquired during Phases 2, 3, and 4: context learn-
ing, DNMS test, and localizer. Data were acquired using a 3T
Siemens Prisma scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) with
a 64-channel volume head coil, located at the Princeton
Neuroscience Institute. Stimuli were presented using a rear-
projection system (Psychology Software Tools, Sharpsburg,
PA). Vocal responses were recorded using a fiber optic noise
cancelling microphone (Optoacoustics, Mazor, Israel), and
manual responses were recorded using a fiber-optic button
box (Current Designs, Philadelphia, PA). A computer running
MATLAB (Version 2012b, MathWorks, Natick, MA) con-
trolled stimulus presentation.
Functional brain images were collected using a T2*-
weighted gradient-echo echo-planar (EPI) sequence (44
oblique axial slices, 2.5 × 2.5 mm inplane, 2.5 mm thickness;
echo time 26 ms; TR 1000 ms; flip angle 50°; field of view
192 mm). To register participants to standard space, we col-
lected a high-resolution 3-D T1-weighted MPRAGE se-
quence (1.0 × 1.0 × 1.0 mm voxels).
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FMRI data preprocessing Preprocessing was performed using
FSL 5.0.6 (FMRIB’s Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/
fsl). The first eight volumes of each run were discarded. All
images were skull-stripped to improve registration. Images
were aligned to correct for participant motion and then aligned
to the MPRAGE. The data were then high-pass filtered with a
cutoff period of 128 seconds; 5 mm of smoothing was applied
to the data.
Region-of-interest definition Our anatomical regions of inter-
est were fusiform gyrus, parahippocampal gyrus, and lingual
gyrus, based on previous reports of visual category-selective
patches of cortex—faces (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun,
1997) and scenes (Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998). We created a
bilateral mask combining these three regions that was used for
all pattern classifier analyses. Masks were made using cortical
parcellation in FreeSurfer with the Destrieux cortical atlas.
Multivariate pattern analysis We extracted the time series of
blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal in our anatomical
regions of interest during the localizer task and labeled each TR
according to the category miniblock to which it belonged. These
labeled time series were used to train an L2-regularized multino-
mial logistic regression classifier (Polyn, Natu, Cohen, &
Norman, 2005) to predict the four class labels (left face/right
face/left scene/right scene). In our classifier, the probabilities that
each class is present do not sum to 1 because we do not assume
the categories aremutually exclusive (e.g., we do not assume that
the presence of left face evidence necessarily indicates right face
absence; Lewis-Peacock &Norman, 2014). To establish the sen-
sitivity of our classifier to the four categories of interest, we
performed a leave-one-out cross-validation. First, we split the
MRI data from the localizer phase into four runs by time.
Then, we trained the classifier on three of the runs, and tested
its performance on the fourth, repeating this procedure once
using each run as the holdout set. The resulting average perfor-
mance was significantly above chance (chance = 25.00%, mean
classifier accuracy = 66.99%, SD = 18.30%), t(35) = 14.1419, p
< .001, one-sample t test compared to chance).
To examine how context reinstatements during the DNMS
task affected RTs, we divided DNMS trials into three time
periods: the period when the target words were presented (tar-
get presentation), the delay period during which participants
only saw a fixation cross (delay period), and the period during
which participants saw the probe word and had to respond
(probe presentation). To account for the hemodynamic lag,
we first shifted our TRs by 5 seconds. Our TRs of interest
for each event included TRs from 0 to 6 seconds after each
event onset (target presentation, delay period start, probe pre-
sentation) plus the shift for hemodynamic lag, with a 1 TR
offset between each event in order to minimize contamination
of signal between the different periods of interest. The trained
classifier was then applied to each volume of activity during
these three periods of each trial of the DNMS task. The clas-
sifier provided a readout of the probability that the BOLD
signal during that volume corresponded to a left-face, right-
face, left-scene, or right-scene image; we will refer to this as
Bleft/right face/scene evidence^.
Experiment 3 results
Behavioral results
Accuracy for all reported participants was above chance:
mean accuracy = 87.27%, SEM = 2.97%. Overall, accu-
racy on Experiment 3 was significantly lower than mean
accuracy on Experiment 2 (unpaired two-sample t test),
t(114) = 3.3797, p < .001. As in Experiment 2, accura-
cy did not differ between the three trial types (target:
mean = 84.44%, SEM = 3.73%; other context: mean =
86.25%, SEM = 3.82%; lure: mean = 87.22%, SEM =
3.76%; paired, two-sided t tests, all ps > .2; see Fig.
6a).
Due to time restrictions, three participants were not able
to complete the posttask word/context memory test. The 33
participants who completed the test performed above
chance, as a group (chance = 25%, mean accuracy =
41.20%, SEM = 3.33%), t(32) = 4.8648, p < .001, two-
sided, one-sample compared-to-chance t test), and for 25/
33 participants individually (proportion p < .001 by bino-
mial test).
In contrast to Experiment 2, there was no difference between
average RTs in the twomismatch probe conditions (other-context
mean log-transformed, z-scored RT = .0311, SD = .2313; lure
mean = .0321, SD =.1780), t(35) = −.0178, p = .9859, paired-
sample, two-sided t test. However, separating trials where sub-
jects correctly identified which context the target words came
from—versus trials where they did not correctly identify the
target context words—revealed that the context-based slowdown
only occurredwhen subjects remembered the target context. This
was true for both log-transformed z-scored RTs (see Fig. 6b) and
raw RTs (see Supplemental Fig. S2). Transformed RTs were
slower on lure trials than on other-context probe trials (p = .03,
paired t test; see Fig. 6b).
Given the lower overall accuracy on the DNMS task com-
pared with Experiment 2 and the low average word/context
memory test scores, it is possible that Experiment 3 participants
did not learn the contexts as well as the Experiment 2 subjects;
we hypothesized that participants would only show the context
related RT effect if they successfully learned the contexts.
Results from a linear mixed-effects regression model that in-
cluded all trials also supported the hypothesis that the slowing on
lure trials in Experiment 2 was driven by reinstated context; the
more that target words were correctly identified in the context
memory test in Experiment 3, the slower the RTs were for lure
trials (β = 11.42, 95% CI [1.55, 21.28], p = .02; seeModel 1). In
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this analysis, we estimated the effect of correctly identifying the
context belonging to the target words on RTs for each trial type
using a mixed-effects linear-regression model. Remembering the
context associated with the target words did not significantly
affect RTs on target or other probe trials, suggesting the slow-
down effect of context was selective to trials where context in-
formation was misleading (i.e., lure trials).
FMRI results
We trained an fMRI pattern classifier to discriminate be-
tween the four encoding contexts. Then we measured
evidence that subjects were reinstating, we measured ev-
idence that subjects were reinstating the encoding context
associated with the target and probe words. Our classifier
did not assume that subjects could only think about one
context at a time (e.g., the classifier could find simulta-
neous evidence for faces on the left and right; Lewis-
Peacock & Norman, 2014).
We tested whether participants were more likely to
reinstate the context associated with the target words
than the other contexts. For each subject, we computed
the average amount of target context minus nontarget
context evidence and compared this value against zero.
Over all subjects, there was significantly more target
context evidence than nontarget evidence, t(35) = 3.34,
p = .002, one-sample t test.
We predicted that, on lure trials, greater reinstatement
of the context associated with the target and probe word
would cause subjects to be slower to respond, on the
assumption that greater activity of the probe word in
working memory will make it harder to identify the
probe as a mismatch. On target trials, in which the
probe word actually was one of the targets, we predict-
ed that reinstating the probe-word context would not
slow performance.
First, we tested whether context reinstatement led to
slowed responses. We estimated the effect size of probe-
Experiment 3 Timeline
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Fig. 5 Experiment 3 timeline. We first trained participants to fixate on the
center of the screen to ensure that they correctly encoded pictures as being
presented on the left or right sides of space. Next, participants associated each
of four Bcontexts^ (two pictures of faces and two pictures of scenes) with a
unique set of 12 words. The order in which faces/scenes were displayed on
the left/right was randomized across participants. Participants then performed
the DNMS task from Experiment 2, after which they performed a one-back
localizer task involving blocks of face, scene, object, and scrambled scene
images presented on the left/right. Images used during the localizer were
distinct from the task stimuli. Finally, participants reported the context with
which they thought each word was associated during the initial context-
learning phase
RT ~ 1 + TargetMemoryScore × TrialType + (1 | Subject)
Model 1 We examine the fixed effects of the different trials (TrialType)
and correctly remembering the context belonging to the target word
(TargetMemoryScore) on reaction time (RT). We also examine the
interaction between the two factors to see whether remembering the
target words’ context affects RTs differently on the different trial types.
We control for idiosyncratic individual subject differences by including
(1|Subject). All trial types were included in this analysis. Inaccurate
trials were excluded from analysis.
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context reinstatements during our time periods of interest
using a mixed-effects linear-regression model for each trial
type (see Model 2). Supporting our hypothesis, greater evi-
dence for delay-period reinstatement of the probe context was
significantly associated with slowed responses on lure trials
(β = 34.62, 95% CI [9.34, 59.89], p = .007).
Following the same logic as the lure trials, we found that
reinstating the probe context on other-context probe trials (and
thus potentially introducing the other-context probe into
working memory) also slowed RTs (β = 49.37, 95% CI
[23.72, 75.02], p < .001; see Fig. 7a). (Probe context reinstate-
ments were also observed to slow RTs on lure and other-
context trials when all trials were included in the model, with
trial type included as an interaction term: β = 38.74, 95% CI
[8.25, 69.23], p = .01.)
Reinstating the probe context during the delay period on
target trials did not slow RTs (β = 0.03, 95% CI [−24.30,
24.36], p = .99; see Fig. 7a), possibly because these reinstate-
ments did not introduce misleading information into working
memory (as these words were just presented and thus should
already be in working memory).
On lure and other context probe trials, we found rein-
stating the nonprobe context during the delay period actu-
ally speeded responses (lure trials β = −96.10, 95% CI
[−171.25, −20.95], p = .01; other-context trials β =
−137.16, 95% CI [−213.49, −60.844, p < .001; Model 2
run with nonprobe context reinstatements instead of probe
context reinstatements). Thus, it does not appear that all
context reinstatements have the same effect on behavior;
misleading (probe context) reinstatements significantly
slowed RTs while nonmisleading (nonprobe context) sig-
nificantly sped reinstatements.
Fig. 6 Experiment 3 behavioral results: RT slowdown only seen on lure
probe trials when subjects learned the target context. a Accuracy did not
differ across the three trial types. Solid horizontal black lines reflect mean
values; dashed horizontal black lines reflect median values. b For trials in
which subjects learned to pair the correct context with the target words,
subjects were slower to respond to lure probes compared with other-
context probes. RTs were log-transformed and z-scored within subject
to control for individual differences in mean RTs and nonnormal RT
distributions. *p < .05. c For trials in which subjects did not correctly
pair the target words with the target context, there was no difference in
RTs across the three conditions
RT ~ 1 + ProbeContextReinstatementTargetsPresentation +
ProbeContextReinstatementsDelay +
ProbeContextReinstatementsProbePresentation + (1 | Subject)
Model 2 We examine the fixed effects of reinstating the probe-word’s
context during different periods of the DNMS trial on reaction time
(RT). ProbeContextReinstatementTargetsPresentation refers to
reinstatements of the probe-word’s context during presentation of the
targets. The same naming convention applies to probe-context rein-
statements during the delay period
(ProbeContextReinstatementsDelay) as well as during the probe pre-
sentation period (ProbeContextReinstatementsProbePresentation). We
control for idiosyncratic individual subject differences by including
(1|Subject). This model was run separately for each trial type.
Inaccurate trials were excluded from analysis.
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Wehypothesized that the context-based RTeffect seen on lure
trials would be further mediated by the degree of association
between the target words and lures. To test this, we exploited a
feature of our experiment that allows us to dissociate between the
effects of reinstating pictures versuswords:While eachwordwas
seen the same number of times with its context picture, there was
variation in the number of times each word was presented with
another word from the same context during context learning. For
each DNMS trial, we computed the number of times the targets
and probe were presented together during encoding, a number
we called Boverlap^; across subjects and trials, overlap scores
ranged from 0 to 7 (mean = 3.62, SD = 1.50).
We predicted that context reinstatements during the delay
period would be more likely to slow RTs if the probe word
was directly associated not just with the context picture but
also with the target words (i.e., had higher overlap scores). We
used a linear mixed-effects regression model to examine how
the overlap between the probe and the targets interacted with
probe context reinstatements to predict RTs. This analysis was
restricted to target and lure trials only, as, by definition, probes
on other-context trials were never presented with the target
words (see Model 3).
We found significant interaction between overlap scores
and evidence for probe-context reinstatement on lure trials
(β = 21.28, 95% CI [4.85, 37.71], p = .01; see Fig. 7b): The
more often a given probe overlapped with target words, the
more effective reinstatements were at slowing reaction times
on lure trials. There was no effect of overlap on RTs for target
trials (β = −3.49, 95% CI [−19.15, 12.18], p = .66).
Fig. 7 a Greater evidence for delay-period reinstatement of the probe
context was associated with slower RTs on lure trials (β = 34.62, 95%
CI [9.34, 59.89], p =.007) and other-context probe trials (β = 49.37, 95%
CI [23.72, 75.02], p < .001). Reinstating the probe context during the
delay period on target trials did not slow RTs, potentially because these
reinstatements did not introduce misleading information into WM on
these trials (β = 0.03, 95% CI [−24.30, 24.36], p = .99). b For lure
trials, we predicted that context reinstatements during the delay period
would be more likely to slow RTs if the lure was directly associated not
just with the context picture but also with the target words. The more
often the probe and targets were encountered together during context
learning, the more likely participants were to exhibit a slowed RT after
reinstating the misleading probe context on lure trials (β = 21.28, 95% CI
[4.85, 37.71], p = .01). This analysis was limited to lure trials because
other-context probes never overlapped with the targets. **p < .01., ***p
< .001. Vertical bars reflect 95% CI. Inaccurate trials were excluded from
analyses in Fig. 7a–b to minimize the effect of attentional lapses on RT
results. (See Supplemental Fig. S3 for analyses including all trials)
RT ~ 1 + ProbeContextReinstatementDelay × Overlap + (1 | Subject)
Model 3 We examine the interaction between the number of times
the probe word and target words were presented together
(Overlap) and the effect of reinstating the probe-word’s context
on reaction time (RT).
ProbeContextReinstatementDelay refers to reinstatements of the
probe-word’s context during the delay. We control for idiosyn-
cratic individual subject differences by including (1|Subject).
Other-context trials were excluded from this analysis, as other--
context probes never overlapped with the targets. This model was
run separately for each trial type. Inaccurate trials were excluded
from analysis.
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Experiment 3 discussion
Experiment 3 revealed that memories reinstated during the
delay period can alter the contents of working memory, even
when these intrusions negatively impact performance on an
upcoming match to sample probe.
Using fMRI, we showed that this effect is specific to the
degree, timing, and episodic content of the reinstated memo-
ries. Namely, disruption results only from context information
reinstated during the maintenance period, as opposed to dur-
ing target or probe presentation. Further, underscoring the
episodic nature of these intruding memories, the effect was
greater when the potentially misleading words had been pre-
sented alongside the target words.
Taken together, these results demonstrate that ongoing ep-
isodic memory reinstatement intrudes on working-memory
maintenance.
General discussion
By maintaining a high-fidelity record of recent information,
working memory allows us to perform tasks that require ac-
curate storage over short periods of time. However, the pres-
ence of distraction or the need to focus on a new task can
compromise that record and impair performance. Episodic
memory complements these characteristics by storing memo-
ries over a longer term, at the cost of reduced fidelity and the
risk of retrieval failure (Cohen & O’Reilly, 1996; McClelland
et al., 1995; O’Reilly & Rudy, 2001).
While the identification and study of these distinct systems
has benefited from efforts to isolate them, it seems unlikely
that they would operate entirely independently of one another
under natural conditions. Regions that exhibit activity associ-
ated with the performance of episodic memory tasks have
been observed to be active even during rest, suggesting ongo-
ing replay of episodic memories (Carr, Jadhav, & Frank, 2011;
Jadhav, Kemere, German, & Frank, 2012; Wilson &
McNaughton, 1994). These memory reinstatements can lead
to the incidental reinstatement of the context in which the
memories were experienced (Bornstein & Norman, 2017).
These reinstatements have also been observed to involve co-
ordinated activity across the entire brain, including prefrontal
areas associated with working-memory maintenance (Miller
& Cohen, 2001). Thus, in a manner analogous to externally
driven stimuli, internally driven reinstatements from episodic
memory may also impact representations stored in working
memory.
Over a series of three experiments, we tested the hypothesis
that episodic memory reinstatement influences performance
under task conditions traditionally used to assess working
memory maintenance, even in the absence of external inter-
ference. In Experiment 1, we showed that, when working
memory maintenance is disrupted in a delayed-recall task,
participants intrude other items from the same context as the
studied target items.
Experiment 2 revealed that, even when accuracy is near
ceiling, other measures of performance can detect intrusions
from episodic memory. On a delayed nonmatch-to-sample
task (DNMS) with a distraction-free 18-second delay, partic-
ipants were slowed in their responding to lure probes—words
that shared an encoding context with the target set, but which
were not actually members of the target set.
Experiment 3 repeated the DNMS task from Experiment 2.
Consistent with the possibility that task-irrelevant context in-
formation can affect behavior, we found that participants
slowed down on lure trials when they had correctly encoded
the context belonging to the target words. Using fMRI in
Experiment 3 allowed us to investigate the behavioral effects
of episodic memory when it was engaged. This analysis re-
vealed that the specific content of episodic-memory reinstate-
ment during the delay period predicted the degree of response
slowing on that trial.
The function of reinstatements
during working-memory maintenance
We have provided evidence that reinstatement of recent expe-
riences from episodic memory has specific, measurable influ-
ence on the contents of working memory, even over short
delay periods in the absence of explicit interference. Why is
working memory influenced by episodic-memory reinstate-
ment, even under these conditions? The effect of episodic-
memory contents on working memory could simply be a side
effect, or it could indicate that laboratory tests of working-
memory maintenance obscure key features of the way that
working memory operates in more naturalistic environments.
One possibility is that episodic memory is recruited by control
mechanisms to Bre f resh^ decaying or d is rupted
representations.
While some of these reinstatements may be strategical-
ly directed recalls in service of maintaining decaying
working-memory representations, others may instead be
ongoing reinstatements of the sort associated with
resting-state activity or forward planning (Deuker et al.,
2013; Foster & Wilson, 2006; Tambini et al., 2010). On
this view, the ability to interact with working memory
may be an adaptive feature of resting-state reinstatements
from episodic memory—in other words, it may not just
sustain but also transform working-memory representa-
tions, by integrating information in working memory with
information from recent events. That these reinstatements
include contextually related events implies that such an
interaction could support rapid, goal-relevant generaliza-
tions (Collins & Frank, 2012; Kumaran & McClelland,
2012; Kumaran, Summerfield, Hassabis, & Maguire,
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2009). The mechanism outlined here both constrains, and
expands, that proposal, with potentially broad impacts for
the study of memory-guided decision-making.
Data and code availability The fMRI data that support the
findings of this study are publicly available on OpenNeuro
(https://openneuro.org/datasets/ds001576/versions/1.0.0).
The behavioral data that support the findings of this study are
available on request from the corresponding author. The
behavioral data are not yet publicly available because they
contain information that could compromise research
participant privacy, such as vocal recordings. All software
used to analyze the data are free and publicly available.
Standard software packages (SPM8 and FSL 5.0.4) were
used for preprocessing the MRI data. The Princeton MVPA
toolbox (https://github.com/PrincetonUniversity/princeton-
mvpa-toolbox) was used to perform MVPA analyses.
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